Kjell Östberg recently wrote a book about the fall of Swedish social democracy, but 25 years ago Sheri Berman wrote one about its rise. She compared its brilliant success with the disastrous failure of the German Social Democrats, and drew some conclusions.

While the Swedish Social Democrats successfully spearheaded the democratisation movement and were then able to fight the economic crisis of the 1930s with Keynesian methods, the Germans let themselves off the hook on both occasions. In fact, they did nothing. Berman tells us that during the years 1918-20, when socialists of various shades had their own majority, they allowed liberals to push through their reforms but otherwise kept a low profile - apart from sending the military after their own supporters because they dared to form their own armed power bodies that the government/party leadership did not control.

Berman suggests that the paralysis was due to the fact that the German Social Democrats were firmly committed to a super-radical programme in which the entire existing society was condemned. Any engagement with it was seen as 'un-Marxist' and a betrayal of the 'cause'. Politics was done for agitational reasons, period. At a given moment, "capitalism" would collapse of its own accord. When it almost did so in 1929, the Social Democrats stood by and applauded. While the Nazis took on the role of saviours of the system - and of society and, indeed, the working class.

The Swedish Social Democrats, on the other hand, were pragmatists who took every opportunity to advance the labour movement's positions of power, however small. They therefore honed their skills in doing this from the start, and gained trust for it. And that sounds good.

Berman is content to go along with the story so far. But what happened next?

Because there can be no doubt that after a spurt of Keynesian (which could equally be called social democratic) reforms in the 1930s, it all came to a quiet halt sometime around 1950. What was happening? Perhaps this was a consequence of the methods with which the earlier successes had been bought?

Östberg thinks so. That it was partly due to the parliamentary fixation, and partly due to the fact that all initiatives were in the hands of employed political ombudsmen. The popular movement that had carried the party to success was dismantled so as not to disturb the calm administration - and therefore there was no strength left to push on.

The editor of this website says much the same thing. The reforms were based on a compromise with the business community, and nothing was allowed to disturb that compromise.

And the question is whether Per Nyström, government politician during the 40s, does not agree too. When the party was reasonably secure in power, politicians tended to be appointed not on the basis of ability and drive, but by regulated promotion, he said. After a few generations, they had forgotten why they were there.

Of course, it is almost pointless to speculate on what they should have done to succeed in both the short and long term. For example, would it have been possible to keep parliamentary and popular movements separate so that there was equal momentum in both places? And will it be possible in a future when there are strong reform movements again?

Either way, it is a sure recipe for failure when the representatives can tell the represented to shut up – and be obeyed. Centre-right politicians would never do anything so stupid.

Negotiators need to have a hard-bound mandate to refer to in order not to give in too much. The pressure from your own base must be at least as great as the pressure from the other party. It damages Berman’s interpretation somewhat that she does not ask herself why the pragmatic Swedish Social Democrats could not understand such a simple principle.

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